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LETTING THE ELECTRICS SLIDE:  
A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO STATE 
DEALER-FRANCHISE LAWS PROHIBITING 
DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER CAR SALES 
Thomas Sperber* 
 
Tesla Motors has a business model for its U.S. sales unlike that of all other 
car manufacturers:  Tesla sells cars directly to consumers rather than 
through a system of independently owned dealers.  Most car manufacturers 
choose not to sell cars this way because most states have dealer laws that 
ban direct-to-consumer sales.  To use this business model, Tesla has had to 
win narrow exceptions to these dealer franchise laws.  It has mostly 
succeeded with this method and can now sell cars, albeit from a limited 
number of company stores, in all but six states. 
Tesla is now suing the state of Michigan claiming that its dealer franchise 
law violates Tesla’s rights to substantive due process and equal protection.  
Traditionally, economic regulations facing Fourteenth Amendment 
challenges are subject only to a low standard of scrutiny that grants great 
deference to legislative judgment.  However, some lower courts have been 
applying a standard of scrutiny that, while still low, requires some inquiry 
into the legitimacy of the legislature’s justifications of the regulation. 
This Note argues that, if Tesla’s case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Court should institute a more exacting standard of review for economic 
regulations that discriminate against one party for the sole purpose of 
protecting the economic interests of another.  The extremely deferential 
reaction to cases such as Lochner v. New York, where the right of parties to 
contract was upheld against all better judgments, has no place in a political 
system where big money interests can influence state legislatures.  To be 
clear, this Note does not ask the Court to carve out an exception for Tesla 
but rather to strike down the universal ban on direct-to-consumer car sales.  
This Note embarks on a thorough review of the Court’s application of 
substantive due process, a study of the current regulatory climate of new car 
sales, and a recommendation that the Court should consider the compelling 
policy reasons to rule in favor of Tesla. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2018, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2014, State University of 
New York at Binghamton.  I would like to thank Professor Andrew Kent and the editors and 
staff of the Fordham Law Review for their guidance and assistance throughout this process.  I 
would also like to thank my family for its unwavering support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A Texan who wants to buy a car from the electric automobile manufacturer 
Tesla accesses Tesla’s website to locate the nearest Tesla “gallery” in his 
state.  He finds that there are eight galleries to choose from in Texas1 and 
drives to the nearest one.  When he arrives, he is greeted by an employee who 
shows him the various models that Tesla sells.  The employee shows the 
Texan a car he likes, prompting him to ask to test-drive it.  Much to the 
Texan’s surprise, the employee says no.  Regardless, the Texan is so smitten 
with the car that he tells the employee he would like to order one anyway, as 
long as the price is reasonable.  The employee explains that not only is he 
forbidden from taking orders, he cannot even discuss the price of the car.2 
Although the Texan’s experience sounds like something from a comedy 
sketch, it is a scenario not unlike those experienced by any resident of Texas, 
Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan, Utah, or West Virginia, where direct sales 
of automobiles are banned.3  In these states, a customer must buy a car from 
an independently owned dealer franchise.  This is incongruent with Tesla’s 
business model.  Tesla employs a system of company-owned stores and 
 
 1. See US Tesla Stores and Galleries, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/findus/list/stores/ 
United+States [https://perma.cc/7DSR-25RZ] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
 2. See Peter Valdes-Dapena, Tesla’s Fight with America’s Car Dealers, CNN (May 20, 
2013, 3:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/20/autos/telsa-car-dealers 
[https://perma.cc/H46B-WNXS]. 
 3. Mike Ramsey, Tesla Weighs New Challenge to State Direct-Sales Bans, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/tesla-weighs-new-challenge-to-state-direct-
sales-bans-1459189069 [https://perma.cc/MB7W-26JQ]. 
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outlets from which people buy cars directly.4  Thus, in states where this 
practice is banned, Tesla can only direct potential customers to its website or 
a neighboring state’s sales department. 
Bans of direct-to-consumer sales of automobiles have their fans and 
detractors.  The National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA), for 
instance, argues that consumers benefit from the support that independent 
dealers can provide beyond the actual sale of the car and from the competition 
between dealers themselves and the multiple car brands that a given dealer 
sells.5  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) argues that the independent-
dealer distribution model actually leads to higher car prices with negligible 
consumer benefit.6  Whether states are on solid constitutional footing with 
these statutes could hinge on whose argument is supported by the evidence. 
Tesla has succeeded in challenging some of these laws by compromising 
with dealer associations and legislators.  These compromises allow car 
manufacturers like Tesla to operate limited numbers of direct-sale stores.7  
Willingness to negotiate, however, has not proved to be a comprehensive 
solution.  For example, a bill in Texas, much like those passed in states that 
carved out exceptions for companies like Tesla, never made it to a vote once 
the state legislature caved to pressure from dealer associations.8  Until now, 
Tesla has only challenged these laws on a state-by-state basis. 
In March 2016, the Wall Street Journal reported that Tesla General 
Counsel Todd Maron was considering a constitutional challenge to these 
laws.9  His team had been studying St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille,10 a Fifth 
Circuit decision that struck down a Louisiana statute requiring licensing of 
coffin manufacturers.11  Some scholars see this case as a possible indicator 
that federal courts may be abandoning the post-Lochner deference given to a 
state legislature when a statute is challenged for violating a plaintiff’s 
economic rights.12  Then, on September 22, 2016, John Bursch, on behalf of 
 
 4. Daniel A. Crane, Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, and the Politics of Crony Capitalism, 
101 IOWA L. REV. 573, 580 (2016). 
 5. MARYANN KELLER & KENNETH ELIAS, CONSUMER BENEFITS OF THE DEALER 
FRANCHISE SYSTEM 2 (2014), https://www.nada.org/workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx? 
id=21474838844 [https://perma.cc/XZP6-VB86]. 
 6. U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opinion Letter on Proposed Michigan Senate Bill 268 (May 
7, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-
comment-regarding-michigan-senate-bill-268-which-would-create-limited-exception-
current/150511michiganautocycle.pdf [https://perma.cc/TF4J-YBEZ]. 
 7. See Crane, supra note 4, at 584 (“In a number of states, Tesla and the car dealers have 
reached agreements on compromise legislation allowing Tesla a fixed number of stores in the 
state:  New Jersey (four dealerships), Ohio (three dealerships), and Pennsylvania (five 
dealerships).”). 
 8. Dylan Baddour, Tesla v. Texas Dealerships Explained:  Are More Luxury Electric 
Cars Headed Our Way?, HOUS. CHRON. (May 23, 2016), 
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/local/explainer/article/texas-law-tesla-franchise-
dealership-electric-cars-7940158.php [https://perma.cc/PCG9-Q44X]. 
 9. Ramsey, supra note 3. 
 10. 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 11. Id. at 217. 
 12. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. 
REV. 527, 577–78 (2015) (“At the very least, [Castille] was a marked departure from the 
approach in Williamson, which effectively sent the message . . . [that] judges should not 
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Tesla Motors, Inc., filed a complaint in the Western District of Michigan for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against Ruth Johnson (Secretary of State and 
Chief Motor Vehicle Administrator), Bill Schuette (Attorney General), and 
Rick Snyder (Governor).13  Tesla is now seeking constitutional relief from 
Michigan’s dealer statute that categorically bans direct-to-consumer sales.14  
In accordance with Maron’s earlier statements, Tesla is claiming a violation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15  If courts’ 
applications of substantive due process are actually changing, then Tesla may 
have a chance of persuading courts to invalidate statutes banning direct-to-
consumer sales. 
This Note, by analyzing the likelihood of Tesla’s success, examines 
substantive due process jurisprudence, a field that, until recently, was well 
settled.  Specifically, this Note attempts to show that Tesla’s claim against 
the State of Michigan presses for the evolution of substantive due process 
and presents courts with an opportunity to reassess the doctrine, which circuit 
courts have experimented with in recent years.  Ultimately, this Note 
explores the possibility that states such as Michigan have dealer statutes 
banning direct-to-consumer sales as a direct result of political lobbying, 
which, alone, may not be a sufficient legal basis for impinging on car 
manufacturers’ rights.  Part I addresses courts’ application of substantive due 
process from the age of Lochner, through the post-New Deal era, and into the 
modern era.  Next, Part II outlines the scope of regulation of the automotive 
industry and examines the viability of Tesla’s direct-sales model.  Lastly, Part 
III assesses the challenges that Tesla would face in persuading the U.S. 
Supreme Court to strike down Michigan’s dealer law, and others like it that 
prohibit direct sales, on the basis of substantive due process. 
I.  WAS IT THE GHOST OF LOCHNER LURKING, 
OR A MERE [LEE] OPTICAL ILLUSION? 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits states from 
depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”16  In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court understood this 
Amendment to “extend to the citizens and residents of the States the same 
protection against arbitrary state legislation, affecting life, liberty and 
property, as is offered by the Fifth Amendment against similar legislation by 
Congress.”17  The Court also recognized that states had designated “police 
powers,” used to govern the “safety, health, morals and general welfare of 
the public” that the Fourteenth Amendment does not affect.18  In the late 
 
invoke the Due Process Clauses to second-guess legislative judgements that interfere with 
economic liberty.”). 
 13. See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Tesla Motors, Inc. v. 
Johnson, No. 16 Civ. 01158 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Tesla Complaint], 2016 
WL 5346201. 
 14. Id. paras. 51–52; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1574 (2017). 
 15. Tesla Complaint, supra note 13, para. 52. 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 17. Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325 (1903). 
 18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these police powers allowed states 
to restrict rights relating to alcohol,19 sanitation,20 property safety,21 and the 
like.  Part I.A highlights the period of the late nineteenth century to the 1930s, 
when the Court would frequently intervene in legislation that it found to be 
an unnecessary intrusion on citizens’ rights.  Part I.B chronicles the period 
from the 1930s onward, when the courts began to defer to legislative 
judgment where neither fundamental rights nor protected classes were 
implicated.  Part I.C studies recent lower court decisions that exhibit a more 
probing review of legislative decisions despite the otherwise deferential 
regime. 
A.  Substantive Due Process:  
Late 19th Century to the 1930s 
In Lochner v. New York,22 the Court struck down a state statute that 
impermissibly abrogated the freedom to contract conferred on individuals by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23  New York State 
passed legislation limiting the maximum weekly hours of bakery workers to 
sixty and the maximum daily hours to ten.24  New York argued that the 
regulation was a valid exercise of its police powers as it regulated the health 
of both bakery workers and customers.25  While recognizing that a state 
legislates permissibly where it is exercising its police power, the Supreme 
Court held that the State of New York had gone beyond its police power by 
opening up nondangerous industries to the state’s “all-pervading power.”26  
The test became whether the statute was “a fair, reasonable and appropriate 
exercise of the police power of the State, or [whether] it [was] an 
unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the 
individual to his personal liberty.”27 
Although an earlier indication of the Constitution’s protection of liberty to 
contract was present in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,28 Lochner was viewed as 
regressive in the face of the increasingly dangerous conditions of industrial 
 
 19. See Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890) (“The police power of the State 
is fully competent to regulate [the sale of liquor] to mitigate its evils or to suppress it 
entirely.”). 
 20. See generally Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884) (allowing the city of San 
Francisco to require hopeful laundromat operators to conform to certain sanitary guidelines). 
 21. See generally Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885) (allowing the state of 
Missouri to require railroad operators to erect and maintain fences along the sides of the 
tracks). 
 22. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 23. Id. at 64. 
 24. Id. at 46 n.1. 
 25. Id. at 58–60. 
 26. Id. at 59 (claiming that the trade of baking was no more dangerous than any other 
trade). 
 27. Id. at 56.  Statutes fitting the latter description were, in the Court’s view, “mere 
meddlesome interferences” with the rights of “grown and intelligent men.” Id. at 61. 
 28. 165 U.S. 578 (1897); id. at 589 (“The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth] 
[A]mendment means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint 
of his person . . . but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen . . . to enter into all 
contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential . . . .”). 
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workplaces.29  Today, Supreme Court Justices still refer to Lochner as an 
“anti-canon” of due process jurisprudence, an example of “judges usurping 
legislative authority by basing decisions on policy preferences rather than 
law.”30  Regardless of the judgment exercised by the Justices as to whether 
regulating the working hours of bakers was actually within the state’s police 
power, it was also important that the state provide scientific reasoning to 
justify the law that the Court found insufficient “to justify the claimed right 
of such interference.’”31 
B.  Substantive Due Process:  
1930s to Present 
Judicial intervention on statutes that, in the Court’s opinion, unjustifiably 
exceeded the state’s police power continued as precedent until the late 1930s.  
Occasionally, courts would uphold economic regulations so long as the 
statute was not “arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the 
policy the legislature is free to adopt.”32  Actual precedential change came 
by way of the Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.33  The 
Court held that the state legislature, in working to protect the interests of 
women in the workplace, had the right to consider which means best 
furthered such an interest, even where “the wisdom of the policy [would] be 
regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain.”34  This reasoning informed 
federal courts’ application of the Due Process Clause to economic regulations 
throughout the twentieth century.35  This rational basis review has resulted in 
the retention of state statutes that, so long as they only abrogate economic 
rights, might be unfair or unwise.36 
Commentators such as Bernard Siegan attribute the ruling in West Coast 
Hotel to President Roosevelt’s attempt to “pack” the Court and the resulting 
“switch in time that saved nine.”37  Justice Owen Roberts, who had voted to 
strike down a state law regulating employment contracts one year prior to the 
 
 29. Its most fervent critics included Theodore Roosevelt and Justice Felix Frankfurter. 
Colby & Smith, supra note 12, at 534–36. 
 30. Id. at 536 (quoting Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B.U. L. REV 859, 
861 (2005)). 
 31. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62. 
 32. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934); see also BERNARD H. SIEGAN, 
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 107 (2d ed. 2006) (finding that of the fifty-six 
times that the Court struck down economic regulations between 1890 and 1936, fifteen were 
decided based on freedom of contract). 
 33. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 34. Id. at 399 (invalidating a state statute imposing a minimum wage for women and 
children). 
 35. See Austin Raynor, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99 
VA. L. REV. 1065, 1069–70 (2013). 
 36. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[T]he existence 
of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for [economic regulation] is not 
to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally 
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational 
basis . . . .”). 
 37. SIEGAN, supra note 32, at 114. 
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decision38 in West Coast Hotel, was the deciding vote.39  The famous 
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.40 is also illuminating 
here.  Just one year after the decision in West Coast Hotel, the Court drew 
the distinction that the Fourteenth Amendment does not call for exacting 
scrutiny where the statute does not abridge fundamental rights41 or affect a 
protected class.42 
Perhaps the most drastic application of the rational basis analysis of 
economic regulation came in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.43  The Court 
upheld a state statute that prohibited an optician from fitting lenses into new 
frames or duplicating existing lenses without a prescription from an 
ophthalmologist or optometrist.44  Despite the Court’s admission that the 
statute may place a “needless, wasteful” burden on opticians and customers, 
it was “for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and 
disadvantages of the new requirement.”45  The Court also used post hoc 
rationales to justify the statute without scrutiny.46 
C.  Substantive Due Process:  
The Court’s Deference to Deference 
The bad taste that Lochner left in the mouths of liberal and conservative 
Justices alike kept the Court from intervening in the legislature’s sphere when 
only economic rights were concerned.47  To be sure, this Note does not 
advocate for a revival of Lochner.  Starting in the 1980s, though, some 
scholars called for the courts to recognize some legitimate judicial 
intervention in state actions that abridge economic rights.48  Richard Epstein 
argued that the Contracts Clause “extends substantial protection to economic 
liberties against legislative . . . interference” and that courts should recognize 
only limited state control over economic activities.49 
 
 38. See generally Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
 39. SIEGAN, supra note 32, at 114. 
 40. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 41. This included restrictions “upon the right to vote, on restraints upon the dissemination 
of information, on interferences with political organizations, as to prohibition of peaceable 
assembly,” and on rights granted by the first ten Amendments. Id. at 153 n.4 (citations 
omitted). 
 42. This protected class included “particular religious, or national, or racial minorities” 
and other “discrete and insular minorities.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 43. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 44. Id. at 486. 
 45. Id. at 487. 
 46. Id. at 491 (“[I]t may be deemed important . . . that the eye doctor be restricted to 
geographical locations that reduce the temptations of commercialism.” (emphasis added)). 
 47. Conservative judges believed that protection of nonenumerated rights was 
“unjustifiable judicial activism,” while liberals decried the protection of the wrong rights and 
suppression of the important and justiciable rights. Colby & Smith, supra note 12, at 556–61. 
 48. Bernard Siegan and Richard Epstein, for instance, separately argued that the Court 
had essentially abdicated its duty to the people to check the legislature’s potential for abuses. 
Id. at 564–65. 
 49. Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 703, 705 (1984). 
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Regardless, state statutes that do not implicate fundamental rights or 
protected classes are given a “‘strong presumption of validity’ under rational 
basis review.”50  That review requires “only that the regulation bear some 
rational relation to a legitimate state interest.”51  The state earns this 
deference by offering merely “the government’s ‘rational speculation’ 
linking the regulation to a legitimate purpose, even ‘unsupported by evidence 
or empirical data.’”52  Although there is no exhaustive list of legitimate 
purposes for the sake of due process review, consumer protection is 
recognized to be a legitimate purpose.53 
In Castille, the Fifth Circuit struck down an economic regulation despite 
applying rational basis review.54  A group of Benedictine monks were 
enjoined from producing and selling caskets in accordance with a state law 
limiting casket sales to funeral homes.55  The court concluded, “plaintiffs 
may . . . negate a seemingly plausible basis for the law by adducing evidence 
of irrationality.”56  It found that the funeral board’s proffered state interest of 
“restrict[ing] predatory sales practices by third-party sellers” and of general 
promotion of health and safety was “betrayed by the undisputed facts.”57  
This, rather obviously, is a dramatic departure from the blind deference 
exhibited by the Supreme Court in Lee Optical Co. 
The Fifth Circuit relied in part on the Sixth Circuit’s assertion in 
Craigmiles v. Giles58 that economic protectionism is not a legitimate state 
interest for the purposes of due process analysis.59  Craigmiles involved a 
challenge to a Tennessee law requiring casket sellers to be licensed by the 
state as funeral directors.60  There, the Sixth Circuit opined that “[e]ven 
foolish and misdirected provisions are generally valid if subject only to 
rational basis review,”61 but “protecting a discrete interest group from 
economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose.”62 
 
 50. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Walker v. Bain, 257 
F.3d 660, 668 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
 51. Id. at 223. 
 52. Id. at 224 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). 
 53. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978) (ruling that protection 
of the public from “vexatious” solicitation is a legitimate state interest for the purposes of 
rational basis review). 
 54. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 225 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 55. Id. at 218. 
 56. Id. at 223. 
 57. Id.  
 58. 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 59. Castille, 712 F.3d at 222–23 (“[E]conomic protection, that is favoritism, may well be 
supported by a post hoc perceived rationale as in Williamson—without which it is aptly 
described as a naked transfer of wealth.” (emphasis added)).  The Fifth Circuit first adopted 
this reasoning in Greater Hous. Small Taxicab Co. v. City of Houston, 660 F.3d 235, 240 (5th 
Cir. 2011). 
 60. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222. 
 61. Id. at 223–24. 
 62. Id. at 224. 
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The Ninth Circuit shares this view.63  Even though the state of Tennessee 
offered the justifications of public health, safety, and consumer protection, 
the court found that there existed “no rational relationship to any of the 
articulated purposes of the state,” leading it to conclude that the state was 
merely protecting licensed funeral directors from competition.64  The Second 
and Tenth Circuits, however, have ruled that economic protection is a 
legitimate stand-alone purpose for the sake of rational basis review.65  The 
Supreme Court has yet to address this issue, so the circuits remain split.66 
It is important to note that Castille and Craigmiles are not revivals of 
Lochner; rather, they are reinterpretations of substantive due process review 
in the post-Lochner landscape.  While the Lochner Court substituted the 
legislature’s interpretation of the bounds of its police powers for its own, the 
Castille and Craigmiles courts examined whether the states’ justifications for 
their laws were legitimate at face value and, if so, whether such bases were 
stated in good faith.  This can be thought of as a two-step inquiry into whether 
a state’s justifications for abridging rights deserve deference under rational 
basis review:  (1) whether the justification is legitimate and, if so, (2) whether 
the justification is directly contravened by facts indicating that the 
justification was made in bad faith. 
The first part of the inquiry, for the purposes of this Note, largely hinges 
on the resolution of the circuit split on economic protectionism.67  The second 
part of the inquiry is murkier, but the Castille and Craigmiles courts clearly 
exercise the authority to examine whether the state’s justifications are 
directly contravened by the available evidence. 
This was a new take on how to apply substantive due process analysis to 
economic regulation.  Not new, though, is the idea that rational basis review 
can require a more probing inquiry into the adequacy of a state’s 
justifications.  The landmark case City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center68 struck down a state statute even though the allegedly discriminatory 
law did not target a protected class.69  The state action at issue was a denial 
of a zoning permit for the operation of a group home (referred to in the 
opinion as “201 Featherston”) for the intellectually disabled.70  Not only did 
the Supreme Court explicitly rule that intellectual disability does not 
constitute “a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard 
 
 63. See Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a licensing 
statute exempting licensure for certain animals but not others fails the rational basis test by 
“singling out . . . three types of vertebrate pests” to “favor economically certain constituents 
at the expense of others similarly situated”). 
 64. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228. 
 65. See Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 2015) (“We join 
the Tenth Circuit and conclude that economic favoritism is rational for purposes of our review 
of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1222 
(10th Cir. 2004) (“[I]ntra-state economic protectionism . . . is a legitimate state interest . . . .”).  
 66. Jarod M. Bona & Luke A. Wake, The Market-Participant Exception to State-Action 
Immunity from Antitrust Liability, COMPETITION, Fall 2014, at 156, 176 n.140. 
 67. Id.  
 68. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 69. See id. at 442, 450. 
 70. See id. at 435. 
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of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social 
legislation,”71 but it also spent several pages explaining why the five 
justifications provided by the city council were irrational.72  One district court 
viewed this case as a “departure from the extreme deference accorded 
legislative bodies in the past” and noted that “it is clear that a court would be 
shrinking from its most basic duty if it abstained from both an analysis of the 
legislation’s articulated objective and the method that the legislature 
employed to achieve that objective.”73 
The Supreme Court is well versed in scrutinizing government justifications 
for discriminatory statutes.  In questions of Commerce Clause violations, for 
example, the Court requires the state to prove that discrimination in a law is 
“demonstrably justified.”74  Leaving the burden to the legislatures, however, 
does not preclude the Court from scrutinizing the proffered rationales and 
disproving them.  In Granholm v. Heald75 the Court faced a consolidated 
challenge to New York and Michigan laws banning direct-to-consumer sales 
of out-of-state wine.76  As one of the justifications provided for the ban, the 
states argued that direct shipment of out-of-state wine would make it difficult 
for the states to prevent underage drinking.77  The Court found that “[t]he 
States provide little evidence that the purchase of wine over the Internet by 
minors is a problem.”78  Though this would likely have been sufficient to 
discredit the states’ justification under the Commerce Clause analysis,79 the 
Court proceeded to review a study by the FTC that provided evidence 
contrary to the states’ claim.80 
While the Supreme Court is not completely reluctant to consider new 
standards of scrutiny, it does voice concerns about straying from the mold.  
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,81 for instance, the Court doubted the 
judiciary’s ability to adequately review the purposes for which states pass 
 
 71. Id. at 442. 
 72. First, “mere negative attitudes, or fear, . . . are not permissible bases for treating a 
home for the [intellectually disabled] differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, 
and the like,” id. at 448; second, “denying a permit based on such vague, undifferentiated fears 
is again permitting some portion of the community to validate what would otherwise be an 
equal protection violation, ” id. at 449; third, the concern of the home being built on a flood 
plain “can hardly be based on a distinction between the Featherston home and, for example, 
nursing homes,” id.; fourth, the “record does not clarify how . . . the characteristics of the 
intended occupants . . . justify denying to those occupants what would be permitted to groups 
occupying the same site for different purposes,” id. at 450; and fifth, “the expressed 
worry . . .  fail[s] rationally to justify singling out a home such as 201 Featherston for the 
special use permit, yet imposing no such restrictions on the many other uses freely permitted 
in the neighborhood,” id. 
 73. Brown v. Barry, 710 F. Supp. 352, 355 (D.D.C. 1989). 
 74. Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 (1992). 
 75. 544 U.S. 460 (2005). 
 76. Id. at 465. 
 77. Id. at 489. 
 78. Id. at 490. 
 79. See id. (“Under our [Commerce Clause] precedents, which require the ‘clearest 
showing’ to justify discriminatory state regulation, this is not enough.” (quoting C & A 
Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994))). 
 80. Id. 
 81. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
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legislation.82  In disregarding the plaintiff’s demand for a heightened scrutiny 
requiring legislation to “substantially advance” a legitimate state interest, the 
Court ruled that such a test “would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of 
a vast array of state and federal regulations” and might “empower . . . courts 
to substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and 
expert agencies”—an endeavor the Court found itself to be “not well suited” 
to.83 
The opinion in Lingle begs a broader question:  is the legislature actually 
best suited to review its own actions for evidence of abuse?  Richard Epstein 
argues that the state commits error in the forms of over- and under-
inclusion.84  He goes on to say that rational basis review sets a court’s “thumb 
too heavily on the side of state power,” thus precluding “any serious review 
of the fit between means and ends.”85  The solution, according to Epstein, is 
to apply an intermediate review where “the court should defer where it 
believes that a legislative decision is likely to be more accurate than its own, 
or more precisely, where it believes the additional costs of its own extended 
supervision . . . is not justified by an incremental improvement in fitting 
means to ends.”86 
II.  FOSTERING FRANCHISES—DEALING DEALERS A LEG UP 
After the first car dealerships emerged in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century, cars were sold both directly by the manufacturers and indirectly by 
the franchised and licensed dealerships.87  It was not until the mid-1920s that 
the “emphasis in the industry [shifted] from production to distribution,” 
which resulted in manufacturers acting more like wholesalers and leaving the 
sales to dealerships.88  The relationship between manufacturers and 
dealerships most resembles a traditional franchise, where the manufacturer 
acts as a franchisor that sells finished products to its dealers, or franchisees, 
who then put the products on the market for general consumption.89  As of 
2010, there were 18,607 car dealerships in the United States, reflecting a 
 
 82. Id. at 544. 
 83. Id. 
 84. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 127–28 (1985). 
 85. Id. at 128. 
 86. Id. at 129; see also Bona & Wake, supra note 66, at 176 n.140 (“Intermediate scrutiny 
might be more appropriate in order to deter self-interested regulatory conduct, on the 
assumption that such conduct cannot enjoy the same presumption of legitimacy.”).  
 87. Francine Lafontaine & Fiona Scott Morton, State Franchise Laws, Dealer 
Terminations, and the Auto Crisis, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2010, at 233, 234–35. 
 88. Id. at 235. 
 89. Traditional franchising contrasts with business-format franchising, where the 
franchisor sells a brand, business model, and resources to a franchisee, who then produces and 
sells a finished product to consumers. Id. at 237.  Classic examples of this business-format 
franchising model include fast-food chains and rental-car businesses. Id.  
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steady decline since 2003.90  Despite that decline, car dealerships are doing 
well; in 2014, car dealership net profits were higher than ever.91 
This Part explores the industry of automobile sales and the regulatory 
climate in which it exists.  Part II.A discusses how and why most state dealer 
statutes were passed.  Part II.B addresses the history and the present form of 
the new car sales industry.  Part II.C weighs the advantages and 
disadvantages of a direct-to-consumer sales model.  Part II.D reviews the 
statute at issue in Tesla.  Lastly, Part II.E outlines past attempts to strike down 
state dealer laws on constitutional grounds. 
A.  State Dealer Statutes:  
Why Were They Passed? 
In 1956, Congress passed the Automobile Dealer’s Day in Court Act 
(ADDICA), which was formally called the Federal Automobile Dealer’s 
Franchise Act.92  This statute requires car manufacturers to act in good faith 
in their dealings with franchisees or else risk statutory damages.93  While 
twenty states had their own franchise regulation statutes prior to ADDICA’s 
enactment, all fifty states have one today; most of them are more dealer 
friendly than ADDICA itself.94  Many states prohibit manufacturers from 
terminating dealership relationships absent “good cause,” require them to 
“demonstrate ‘need’ to establish a new dealership in a[n existing] dealer’s 
‘Relevant Market Area,’” and require them to buy back unsold vehicles upon 
termination of a franchise contract.95 
Although ADDICA never so required, many of the subsequent state dealer 
statutes included provisions that prevented manufacturers from selling cars 
directly to consumers.96  Such statutes do not always prohibit direct sales 
explicitly, but they at least prohibit manufacturers from having ownership 
 
 90. See id. at 236. 
 91. Phil LeBeau, Auto Dealers Racked Up Record Profits in 2014, CNBC (Apr. 10, 2015), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/10/auto-dealers-racked-up-record-profits-in-2014.html 
[https://perma.cc/T7GV-LQGC].  
 92. Pub. L. No. 84-1026, 70 Stat. 125 (1956) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1225 
(2012)); see Lafontaine & Morton, supra note 87, at 239. 
 93. 15 U.S.C. § 1222. 
 94. See Lafontaine & Morton, supra note 87, at 239.  See generally Carla Wong 
McMillian, What Will It Take to Get You in a New Car Today?:  A Proposal for a New Federal 
Automobile Dealer Act, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 67 (2009) (proposing a new federal law that would 
not only replace ADDICA but would preempt state dealership regulation).  McMillian argues 
that state dealer acts, as they stand, “have essentially supplanted the dealer agreement to define 
the terms of the manufacturer-dealer relationship.” Id. at 73.  She goes on to assert that a new 
federal act could allow franchisors and franchisees to contract efficiently while still protecting 
their interests. Id. at 101–03. 
 95. Lafontaine & Morton, supra note 87, at 234–41.  For an example of a statutory 
“relevant market area,” see WASH. REV. CODE § 46.96.140(1)(a)–(c) (1994). 
 96. See John T. Delacourt, New Cars and Old Laws:  An Examination of Anticompetitive 
Regulatory Barriers to Internet Auto Sales, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 155, 167 (2007). 
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stakes in their franchisee dealerships.97  Other dealer statutes, like 
Michigan’s, ban direct-to-consumer sales more explicitly.98 
B.  State Dealer Statutes:  
Who Do They Protect? 
Today, new-car-dealership profits are higher than ever,99 but they do not 
derive much of those profits from the sale of new cars.100  Most dealerships 
make their money primarily from reimbursements for repairs and from used-
car sales.101  While dealerships have benefitted from the protectionist 
climate,102 many scholars and economists believe that this protection—
specifically, bans on direct-to-consumer sales—ultimately results in losses to 
consumers.103  In a letter referencing the statute that Tesla now challenges, 
the FTC cited similar studies and urged “the legislature to consider 
abandoning the direct sales prohibition in Michigan’s existing law, and 
instead permit manufacturers and consumers to reengage the normal 
 
 97. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 463(2) (McKinney 2017) (noting that “[i]t shall 
be unlawful for any franchisor, not withstanding the terms of any franchise contract . . . to 
acquire any interest in any additional motor vehicle dealer in this state,” excepting where the 
interest is only temporary). 
 98. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1574 (2017) (“A manufacturer shall not . . . 
[d]irectly or indirectly own, operate, or control a new motor vehicle dealer, including, but not 
limited to, a new motor vehicle dealer engaged primarily in performing warranty repair 
services on motor vehicles under the manufacturer’s warranty, or a used motor vehicle 
dealer.”). 
 99. See LeBeau, supra note 91. 
 100. In 2015, the average net loss per new vehicle retailed was $22. STEVEN SZAKALY & 
PATRICK MANZI, NADA DATA 2015:  ANNUAL FINANCIAL PROFILE OF AMERICA’S 
FRANCHISED NEW-CAR DEALERSHIPS 2 (2015), https://www.nada.org/WorkArea/ 
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=21474839497 [https://perma.cc/8QMR-7VH4]. 
 101. Service, parts, and body-shop departments made, on average, 59.4 percent of the total 
average gross income in 2015, and 17.6 percent of that figure was warranty work. Id. at 3.  
Although the NADA does not separate financing profit from new-car sales profit, financing 
and insurance make up a significant portion of that figure. Moneytips.com, How Car 
Dealerships Really Make Their Money, BDN ME. (Aug. 5, 2015, 5:33 PM), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2015/08/05/business/how-car-dealerships-really-make-their-
money [https://perma.cc/426L-M4N8].  In 2015, the average retail net profit per used car sold 
was $132 versus $22 lost on each new car sold. See SZAKALY & MANZI, supra note 100, at 2–
3. 
 102. See Moneytips.com, supra note 101 (citing auto sales growth for five uninterrupted 
years at an average growth rate of 9 percent); see also Eric D. Stolze, A Billion Dollar 
Franchise Fee?  Tesla Motors’ Battle for Direct Sales:  State Dealer Franchise Law and 
Politics, 34 FRANCHISE L.J. 293, 306 (“Today, the country’s largest automotive dealer is a 
publicly traded company, operating ‘265 dealerships in 15 states selling 32 different brands,’ 
with a total market capitalization exceeding $7 billion.” (quoting Peter Valdes-Dapena, 
AutoNation to Become McDonald’s of Car Dealers, CNN (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/31/autos/autonation-car-dealerships [https://perma.cc/R8TB-
JJUW])). 
 103. John Delacourt includes restrictions on manufacturers’ ability to advertise, issue 
referral fees, broker financing, and sell cars or ancillary services as hindrances to efficiency 
and innovation in car sales. Delacourt, supra note 96, at 164–68.  He refers to bans on direct-
to-consumer sales as “[p]erhaps the most universal, and fundamental, restriction imposed by 
automotive franchise law,” as it “prevent[s] manufacturers from actively taking the same, 
retail-level financial risks that [state dealer laws] supposedly impos[e] on dealers.” Id. at 167.   
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competitive process that prevails in most other industries.”104  In its letter, 
the FTC characterized the statute as offering “protectionism for independent 
franchised dealers, to the detriment of Michigan car buyers.”105 
The International Center for Law and Economics (ICLE) also weighed in 
on this issue when Tesla was battling with the New Jersey legislature.106  The 
ICLE characterized New Jersey’s ban on direct sales as an unjustified 
“restraint of commerce.”107  It went on to say that the regulation serves to 
“reduce competition in New Jersey’s automobile market for the benefit of its 
auto dealers and to the detriment of its consumers.”108  To justify this 
conclusion, the ICLE argued that dealers and manufacturers have the same 
ability to exploit their full market power through price markups but that 
eliminating independent dealer distribution incentivizes the use of the most 
efficient model.109  Others argue that state laws regulating the manufacturer-
dealer relationship have led to an “over-dealered market,” which, in turn, has 
contributed to the failure, and subsequent bailout, of the “Big Three” 
American car companies.110 
There are some, however, who contend that the franchised-dealer model is 
better for consumers and competition alike.  The NADA argues that such 
laws protect the interests of smaller car dealerships and consumers by forcing 
local dealers to compete with one another, while still protecting them from 
the market whims of big manufacturers that could, absent such regulation, 
open up multiple dealerships next to one another and saturate local 
markets.111  The NADA also argues that manufacturers benefit from being 
spared the burden of selling their own cars because, historically, they have 
“failed miserably” in their attempts to enter the retail business.112  The 
NADA’s tendency to support statutes banning direct-to-consumer sales 
should not come as a surprise. 
 
 104. U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 6, at 11. 
 105. Id. at 1. 
 106. Letter from Int’l Ctr. for Law & Econ. to Chris Christie, Governor of N.J. (Mar. 26, 
2014), https://law.wm.edu/documents/Tesla_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W2V-RAEG]; see 
also Hunter Walker, Tesla Goes to War Against Chris Christie, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2014, 
12:25 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-motors-vs-chris-christie-2014-3 
[https://perma.cc/33X4-L8VQ]. 
 107. Id. at 1. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 3 (arguing that neither the ICLE nor the Motor Vehicle Commission are well 
suited to comment on which system is best for consumers). 
 110. McMillian, supra note 94, at 68; see also Kate Linebaugh, The Trials of the Auto 
Dealer, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122969965719421799 
[https://perma.cc/NK3N-JKHV]. 
 111. See generally Why Dealer Franchise Laws?, NADA, https://www.nada.org/ 
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=21474838847 [https://perma.cc/X8ZS-FRLC] (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
 112. Auto Retailing:  Why the Franchise System Works Best, NADA 1, 
https://www.nada.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=21474838843 
[https://perma.cc/8BHT-ZJ8Z] (arguing that retailing requires skills better suited to 
individually owned dealerships and that small businesses are better positioned to incur the 
inherent costs of business). 
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Some major car manufacturers, General Motors (GM) for example, have 
also supported retail regulation.  In response to a proposed bill allowing Tesla 
to circumvent Ohio’s ban of direct-to-consumer sales, GM wrote a letter 
addressed to Governor John Kasich arguing that allowing Tesla to eschew 
the dealership-franchise model would amount to unfair competition.113  GM 
also made an official statement in support of the bill that amended Michigan’s 
dealer statute that Tesla now challenges.114 
While it may be counterintuitive that a major car manufacturer would 
support legislation that imposes more regulations on the production and 
distribution of automobiles, GM has its own horse in the electric-car race.  
Chevrolet, a subsidiary of GM, released the all-new Bolt EV for 2017.115  
Prior to its introduction of the Bolt, electric-car buyers had only one model 
to choose from if they needed a battery range of anything beyond 150 miles:  
the Tesla Model S.116  The Bolt, with its 238 miles of range, as rated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is the only electric car to challenge 
Tesla’s range supremacy.117 
C.  Does the Direct-to-Consumer Sales Model Make Sense? 
The FTC hosted Todd Maron, Tesla’s General Counsel, at a conference 
entitled “Auto Distribution:  Current Issues & Future Trends” in January 
2016.118  Maron outlined seven reasons why a traditional franchise-
dealership system would not be viable for Tesla:  (1) dealership locations,119 
 
 113. See Eric Loveday, General Motors Sends Anti-Tesla Direct Sales Letter to Ohio 
Governor, INSIDEEVS (Mar. 24, 2014), http://insideevs.com/general-motors-sends-anti-tesla-
letter-ohio-governor [https://perma.cc/FF8F-EYRZ].  
 114. See Damon Lavrinc, General Motors Supports Anti-Tesla Motors Bill in Michigan, 
JALOPNIK (Oct. 21, 2014, 12:18 PM) http://jalopnik.com/general-motors-supports-anti-tesla-
bill-in-michi-1648915169 [https://perma.cc/B36P-452F] (“We believe that House Bill 5606 
will help ensure that all automotive manufacturers follow the same rules to operate in the State 
of Michigan; therefore, we encourage Governor Snyder to sign it.”).  Michigan House Bill 
5606 became section 445.1574 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. See MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 445.1574 (2017). 
 115. Chevrolet Bolt EV, CHEVROLET, http://media.chevrolet.com/media/us/en/ 
chevrolet/vehicles/bolt-ev/2017.html [https://perma.cc/8UL9-VYGY] (last visited Nov. 19, 
2017). 
 116. A base Tesla Model S is rated by the EPA to have 218 miles of electric range, while 
the next highest range of 114 miles was found in the BMW i3. Joseph Capparella, Home on 
the Range:  2017 Chevrolet Bolt EPA Rated at 238 Miles of Range, CAR & DRIVER (Sept. 13, 
2016, 12:01 AM) http://blog.caranddriver.com/2017-chevy-bolt-ev-epa-rated-at-238-miles-
of-range [https://perma.cc/56QF-MRVK]. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Matt Pressman, Tesla Defends Direct Sales Model at FTC Talks; Cites Unfair 
Opposition from GM, EVANNEX (Jan. 23, 2016) https://evannex.com/blogs/news/74602181-
tesla-defends-direct-sales-model-at-ftc-talks-cites-unfair-opposition-from-gm 
[https://perma.cc/UJZ7-6ZV6].  
 119. Id. (explaining that Teslas utilize technology new and foreign enough to necessitate 
locations in high foot-traffic areas rather than the “out-of-the-way” locations of traditional car 
dealerships). 
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(2) inventory differences,120 (3) longer sales cycles,121 (4) different profit 
models,122 (5) no advertising,123 (6) dealer price markups,124 and (7) conflicts 
of interest.125  While this Note does not detail every one of these reasons, 
several of them are supported by the research outlined below. 
In 2014, Consumer Reports endeavored to study the ability and willingness 
of car dealers to sell their electric and hybrid inventory.126  Of the eighty-five 
dealerships visited in the survey by “secret shoppers” inquiring about buying 
a hybrid or electric car, thirty-five recommended buying a gas-powered car 
instead, and thirteen discouraged the purchase of a hybrid or electric car 
entirely.127  More to Maron’s point that a dealership cannot effectively sell 
both gas-powered and electric cars, Consumer Reports found “a strong 
correlation between the salesperson’s knowledge about electric cars and their 
propensity to encourage people to buy them.”128  While Maron’s contention 
that dealerships earn the bulk of their profits from service and parts is also 
true,129 Consumer Reports found the 2015 Tesla Model S to have a “worse-
than-average” problem rate, stemming mostly from problems with “the 
drivetrain, power equipment, charging equipment, giant iPad-like center 
console, and body and sunroof squeaks, rattles, and leaks.”130 
The Trefis Team, a collection of Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
engineers and Wall Street analysts,131 believe that based on the profit margins 
of the Tesla Model S, the direct-sales model is critical for Tesla’s success.132  
Trefis predicts that the gross profit margin for the Tesla Model S will be 
approximately 27.5 percent, which will increase to 30 percent over the next 
six years.133  If those margins were to steadily decline, however, there could 
 
 120. Id. (noting that Teslas are ordered custom from the factory, so dealerships would not 
have inventory on-site).  
 121. Id. (speculating that Tesla customers would need more time with salespeople than 
dealerships can traditionally provide). 
 122. Id. (claiming that, unlike dealerships, Tesla derives all of its profits from new-car sales 
and none from parts, service, or financing). 
 123. Id. (noting that Tesla does not advertise). 
 124. Id. (positing that for a dealership to make a profit, it would need to sell Teslas at a 
price marked up from the price available online or only in states that allow direct sales). 
 125. Id. (arguing that a dealership could not effectively sell internal combustion cars and 
electric cars at the same time). 
 126. Eric Evarts, Dealers Not Always Plugged in About Electric Cars, Consumer Reports’ 
Study Reveals, CONSUMER REP. (Apr. 22, 2014, 8:00 AM) http://www.consumerreports.org/ 
cro/news/2014/04/dealers-not-always-plugged-in-about-electric-cars-secret-shopper-study-
reveals/index.htm [https://perma.cc/3J2W-7MB5].  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. 
 129. See supra Part II.B. 
 130. Mark Rechtin, Tesla Reliability Doesn’t Match Its High Performance, CONSUMER 
REP. (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.consumerreports.org/cars-tesla-reliability-doesnt-match-its-
high-performance [https://perma.cc/8KV9-FRHY].  
 131. Trefis Team Full Bio, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/ 
people/trefis/#319338154462 [https://perma.cc/EV9R-PRXC] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).  
 132. Trefis Team, Is the Direct Sales Model Critical for Tesla Motors?, FORBES (Mar. 3, 
2016, 8:40 AM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2016/03/03/is-the-direct-
sales-model-critical-for-tesla-motors/#4706144f23b3 [https://perma.cc/4B9R-CCUW].  
 133. Id. 
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be a substantial downside.134  Trefis believes that a dealership model would 
cut too far into these margins without being able to “prove itself in the mass 
market to enjoy economies of scale.”135  Furthermore, Tesla’s direct sales 
model is likely to save consumers money.  Thirty percent of an average new 
vehicle’s price covers distribution costs, and allowing manufacturers to 
distribute products themselves could save consumers between $1500 and 
$2600 per new car sold.136 
Daniel Crane highlights the electric automotive upstart Fisker Automotive, 
whose failure is possibly attributable to its decision to pursue a franchise 
distribution model rather than a direct distribution model.137  By deciding to 
sell its cars through franchised dealerships, Fisker used existing dealer 
networks that had also dedicated themselves to selling other manufacturers’ 
cars.138  While Fisker had myriad problems that likely contributed to its 
failure139 and the car was sold for too short a time for there to be data as to 
whether its distribution model was flawed,140 it is not hard to imagine the 
difficulty in selling a brand-new, foreign electric car alongside gas-powered 
cars made by manufacturers with household names.  Kelley Blue Book 
analyst Karl Brauer argues that, were the legislature to force Tesla to sell its 
cars alongside conventional gas-powered cars, they could see their “image 
and customer experience splinter into thousands of pieces,” which a new 
entrant to the automobile market cannot afford.141 
Despite the regulatory roadblocks, Tesla’s business model appears to be 
attractive enough to have inspired at least one other automotive upstart to sell 
directly.  Lynk & Co, a newly formed carmaker spun off from China’s Geely, 
is planning to sell cars through a combination of online order processing and 
company-owned outlets.142  Believing that distribution costs contribute to 25 
 
 134. Trefis calculated a possible 15 percent loss if the margins were to sink to 25 percent. 
Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Cynthia Barmore, Tesla Unplugged:  Automobile Franchise Laws and the Threat to 
the Electric Vehicle Market, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 185, 201 (2014). 
 137. Crane, supra note 4, at 581–82. 
 138. Id. at 581. 
 139. See generally Katie Fehrenbacher, A Look Under the Hood:  Why Electric Car Startup 
Fisker Crashed and Burned, GIGAOM (Apr. 17, 2013, 5:29 PM), https://gigaom.com/2013/04/ 
17/a-look-under-the-hood-why-electric-car-startup-fisker-crashed-and-burned 
[https://perma.cc/LEZ9-VQZM] (citing problems such as regulatory delays, reliance on parts 
suppliers, public relations problems, executive upheaval, and recalls for dangerously defective 
parts). 
 140. Crane, supra note 4, at 581–82. 
 141. Brian Fung, Why Tesla Keeps Fighting for Direct Sales When It Could Just Work with 
Dealers, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2014/10/22/why-tesla-keeps-fighting-for-direct-sales-when-it-could-just-work-
with-dealers [https://perma.cc/YN2A-RX75].  
 142. Mike Duff, Lynk & Co Brand to Do Without Dealerships, Sell “Smartphones on 
Wheels,” CAR & DRIVER (Oct. 24, 2016, 9:16 AM), http://blog.caranddriver.com/lynk-co-
brand-to-do-without-dealerships-sell-smartphones-on-wheels [https://perma.cc/E43H-
X8MN].  Alain Visser, senior vice president of Lynk & Co, noted, “We’re learning from what 
Tesla has been doing there . . . .  It’s not easy, and we know that because Tesla is a ‘home’ 
brand it has an advantage. . . .  [A]t the end of the day—our model will create employment.” 
Id. 
1450 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
percent of a car’s price, Lynk & Co intends to pass these savings along to the 
consumer.143  As of this writing, the company has not publicly addressed the 
legal hurdles facing direct car sales. 
Independent dealerships, though, do provide valuable services to 
consumers.144  Dealers can provide maintenance services, regulatory services 
relating to registration and titling, and social services ensuring that 
customers’ cars are road ready.145  It is unknown whether Tesla-owned stores 
could provide these services as effectively as independently owned dealers.  
The NADA argues that the integration of manufacturing and distribution will 
rob consumers of these safeguards.146  Others who believe that the dealership 
model is effective include business mogul Warren Buffett, who explained, 
“When a distribution system . . . becomes that firmly established, there’s a 
reason for it.”147 
D.  The Michigan Amendment 
In May 2014, the Michigan legislature introduced an amendment to 
Michigan’s dealer franchise law.  Michigan House Bill 5606148 was a 
proposed amendment to Michigan’s dealer law that added to the list of 
prohibitions on car manufacturers.149  Among the existing prohibitions was 
subsection (i), which forbade carmakers from selling “any new motor vehicle 
directly to a retail customer other than through its franchised dealers.”150  
This particular subsection was left untouched until the legislature introduced 
an amended bill on October 2, 2014.  In this version of Michigan House Bill 
5606, subsection (i) had the word “its” removed and provided that a 
manufacturer could not “[s]ell any new motor vehicle directly to a retail 
customer other than through franchised dealers.”151 
The amendment was introduced by Republican Representative Aric 
Nesbitt.152  Representative Nesbitt was the lead Republican staffer for the 
 
 143. Martin Gurdon, Geely Confirms Direct Sales for New Lynk & Co Brand, 
MOTORTRADER (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.motortrader.com/motor-trader-news/automotive-
news/geely-sell-lynk-co-cars-online-retail-stores-20-10-2016 [https://perma.cc/Q4CJ-45PE].   
 144. See Barmore, supra note 136, at 200. 
 145. See id. at 200–01. 
 146. See supra Part II.B. 
 147. Daron Gifford, Why Warren Buffett Is Wrong on Car-Dealer Model, CNBC (Apr. 9, 
2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/09/why-warren-buffett-is-wrong-on-car-dealer-model-
commentary.html [https://perma.cc/Q2SP-SLPT].  Gifford also mentioned that one month 
before his interview with Buffett, Buffett’s company, Berkshire Hathaway, acquired the 
largest privately held dealership group in the United States. Id.  
 148. H.R. 5606, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (as introduced in Michigan House of Representatives 
on May 28, 2014). 
 149. The bill would amend the statute to add that a manufacturer may not “ prevent, attempt 
to prevent, prohibit, coerce, or attempt to coerce a new motor vehicle dealer from charging 
any consumer any fee or charge allowed to be charged by the dealer under the laws of this 
state.”  H.R. 5606 (as introduced in Michigan House of Representatives on May 28, 2014). 
 150. Id. (emphasis added). 
 151. H.R. 5606, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (as passed by Michigan Senate on Oct. 2, 2014). 
 152. Id.; see also 2014 Michigan Public Acts Table, LEGISLATIVE SERVICE BUREAU 36 
(Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2013-2014/publicacttable/pdf/ 
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Congressional Natural Gas Caucus and wrote the Natural Gas Subcommittee 
Report on Energy and Job Creation,153 which highlights “the EPA’s 
continued assault on fossil fuels.”154  Although Representative Nesbitt is 
listed as the legislator who introduced the amendment, Tesla Motors posted 
on its blog that it was Republican Senator Joe Hune who struck the word “its” 
from the amendment.155  The National Institute on Money in State Politics 
found that the Michigan Auto Dealers Association (MADA) contributed over 
$15,000 to Senator Hune’s campaign efforts; its contribution during the 2014 
election cycle was the biggest yet.156 
After the amendment passed, GM issued a public statement applauding the 
State of Michigan for banning direct sales of automobiles.157  The company 
stated that the bill “will provide stability and support for our dealers” and will 
“ensure we compete under the same rules in the marketplace as other 
automobile manufacturers.”158 
E.  Previous Attempts to Strike Down Dealer Statutes 
While some lower courts have applied standards of review requiring more 
scrutiny, no lower court has struck down a state dealer law on constitutional 
grounds.  In Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. Hull,159 a collection of 
carmakers sued the state of Arizona on Commerce Clause and 
anticompetitive grounds for amending its auto dealer statute160 to ban 
manufacturers from selling ancillary services, such as parts, services, 
accessories, or financing.161  The court found that the statute did not 
impermissibly prevent manufacturers from indirectly competing because 
existing franchise statutes already protected dealers from “competitive 
business practices by the manufacturers.”162 
 
2014-PAT.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP2R-44UJ] (indicating that House Bill 5606 was filed and 
effected on October 21, 2014). 
 153. See generally STATE OF MICH. H.R. SUBCOMM. ON NAT’L GAS, REPORT ON ENERGY 
AND JOB CREATION, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2012), http://banmichiganfracking.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/NaturalGasReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CRE7-L8MR]. 
 154. Id. at 20. 
 155. The Tesla Motors Team, A Raw Deal in Michigan, TESLA (Oct. 16, 2014) 
https://www.tesla.com/blog/raw-deal-michigan [https://perma.cc/8MHA-LSXH].  Tesla also 
claimed that the version of the amendment striking the word “its” was introduced on “the last 
day of the legislative session.” Id.  
 156. Contributions of Michigan Auto Dealers Association to Joe Hune, 
FOLLOWTHEMONEY.ORG, http://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?c-t-eid=1393809&d-
eid=3185%23%5B%7B4%7C#[{1|gro=c-t-id,d-eid [https://perma.cc/CXU8-LEKC] (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
 157. Press Release, Gen. Motors, Statement on GM Support of Michigan House Bill (Oct. 
21, 2014), http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/ 
en/2014/Oct/1021-hb-5066.html [https://perma.cc/CQR6-VB4W].  
 158. Id.  
 159. 137 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Ariz. 2001). 
 160. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-4460 (2017). 
 161. All. of Auto. Mfrs., 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1168–69. 
 162. Id. at 1174.  The court also asserted, without apparent support, that “[s]uch franchise 
laws keep the disparity of power between manufacturers and dealers in check.” Id. at 1168.  
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In Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Department of Transportation,163 Ford 
claimed that a Texas statute that prohibited manufacturers from acting as car 
dealers deprived Ford of equal protection and due process and sued to enjoin 
the enforcement of the statute.164  Ford had developed a system where 
customers could view preowned cars online and schedule test drives; Ford 
would then deliver the car to a voluntarily participating dealer who could sell 
the car on consignment.165  The court found that the state did not treat Ford 
dissimilarly to other manufacturers, and, thus, that the enforcement was 
constitutional.166 
In International Truck & Engine Corp. v. Bray,167 International challenged 
the enforcement of a Texas statute168 that applied to the sale of commercial 
trucks for violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.169  International 
argued that the statute treated in-state and out-of-state manufacturers 
differently by creating an exception to the statute170 that allows a single 
manufacturer of motorhomes to also act as a dealer, evidencing Texas’s 
arbitrary, if not discriminatory, intent.171  The court found that the 
legislature’s proffered interests in preventing unfair advantage to vertically 
integrated companies were legitimate and that barring International from 
acting as a dealer was a rational furtherance of these interests.172 
Lastly, in Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. v. Currey,173 another 
conglomeration of car manufacturers brought an antitrust and Contract 
Clause action against the State of Connecticut over a 2009 amendment to the 
Connecticut Franchise Act,174 which revised the proscribed method for 
calculating dealer compensation for warranty work and barred manufacturers 
from recouping costs incurred by such reimbursement provisions.175  The 
court summarized the plaintiff’s argument as follows: 
The provisions were actually motivated by a decrease in the volume of 
warranty repairs; that the legislature deliberately sought to recapture lost 
revenue; that the law insulates dealers from competition with independent 
service shops; and that a growing body of literature undercuts “the well-
worn rationale that all motor vehicle franchise laws, no matter how 
oppressive, overreaching or economically devastating to manufacturers and 
 
 163. 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 164. Id. at 498. 
 165. See id. at 498–99. 
 166. Id. at 510–11.  Ford pointed to a similar GM website that the court found permissible 
under the statute, but the Court emphasized that a third-party dealer operated the GM website 
and, thus, GM was not acting as a dealer through that contract. Id. 
 167. 372 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 168. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2301.476(c) (West 2017). 
 169. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 372 F.3d at 724–25. 
 170. OCC. § 2301.476(h). 
 171. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 372 F.3d at 726–27. 
 172. Id. at 728. 
 173. 984 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D. Conn. 2013), aff’d, 610 F. App’x 10 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 174. Id. at 39–40. 
 175. Id. at 40. 
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consumers, are necessary to protect dealers from abuses by manufacturers 
or to level the playing field to equalize the parties’ bargaining power.”176 
The court dismissed Alliance’s complaint, holding that Alliance failed to 
allege facts sufficient to overcome the “strong presumption of legislative 
rationality,” despite reference to a “body of literature” that undercut the 
legislature’s justifications.177  The Second Circuit issued a nonprecedential 
affirmation of the district court’s ruling.178 
III.  CAN TESLA TOPPLE THE TRADE-IN TITANS? 
If Tesla’s case reaches the Supreme Court, Tesla has two substantial 
hurdles to persuade the Court to rule in its favor.  This Part addresses each 
hurdle in turn.  Part III.A explains that Tesla needs to show the Court why its 
case is unlike every other constitutional challenge that has been brought 
against dealer statutes.  Part III.B then argues that Tesla needs to convince 
the Court to adopt a more searching review of the legitimacy of the 
government’s interests supporting the amendment, as well as the rationality 
with which the legislature believes the amendment will further those 
interests. 
A.  Why Tesla Is Different 
Tesla’s case is different from the constitutional challenges outlined in Part 
II.E.  In each of those cases, the court reasoned that protecting the interests 
of parties dissimilarly situated, such as dealers against manufacturers, does 
not cause constitutional problems.  In Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers 
v. Hull, the manufacturers claimed that the challenged statute granted dealers 
a competitive edge over manufacturers.179  Likewise, in Ford Motor Co. v. 
Texas Department of Transportation, Ford claimed that the statute gave an 
unfair advantage to used-car dealers, not that it gave an unfair advantage to 
some car manufacturers over others.180  In International Truck & Engine 
Corp. v. Bray, the plaintiff claimed that one in-state dealer was given an 
advantage, not that in-state manufacturers were generally treated 
dissimilarly.181  Lastly, in Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. v. 
Currey, the plaintiffs argued that the state was insulating dealers from 
competition with independent car-service businesses.182 
The unwritten common thread throughout these failed attempts to strike 
down dealer statutes is that each plaintiff alleged that the statutes protected 
the interests of parties that were not so similarly situated as to be a deprivation 
of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.  This translates best to the rationality 
prong of a due process challenge because if a statute does not treat similarly 
 
 176. Id. at 60 (quoting the plaintiff’s allegations in its complaint). 
 177. Id. at 60–61. 
 178. All. of Auto. Mfrs. v. Currey, 610 F. App’x 10, 11 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 179. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text. 
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situated actors equally, then it should fail to meet the rational relation 
requirement.  Thus, as long as all manufacturers are affected equally, these 
courts would not necessarily find a violation.  In each of the cases above, the 
dealer statutes affected all similarly situated parties equally. 
Tesla’s argument is different.  In its complaint, Tesla alleges that “the only 
possible purpose [for the statute] is to protect two discrete Michigan-based 
interest groups—Michigan’s franchised auto dealers and Michigan-based 
manufacturers—from economic competition.”183  Tesla also claims that a 
franchise model, as exercised by all other car manufacturers who sell cars in 
the United States, would not be viable for either Tesla or the hypothetical 
independent Tesla dealers.184  Tesla’s claim is unique from the other car 
manufacturers’ claims because Tesla alleges that Michigan discriminates 
against it relative to all other car manufacturers.  Thus, the discrimination 
arbitrarily affects parties that are similarly situated.  Furthermore, because 
there are no independent Tesla dealerships, the statute is not protecting any 
dealership interests against Tesla as a manufacturer, so the rulings by the 
courts in the previous four cases do not govern here. 
Although subjected to the stricter scrutiny applied in Commerce Clause 
cases, the Supreme Court’s consideration of state-proffered justifications in 
Granholm v. Heald is more analogous here than the consideration given to 
other car manufacturers’ claims against state dealer laws.  Not only are the 
underlying restrictions of rights similar in both cases,185 the sources of 
evidence contradicting the states’ rationales are also similar.186 
B.  Stare Decisis 
Even if the Court were to find that Tesla is different from those other car 
manufacturers that have failed where Tesla hopes to succeed, the Supreme 
Court would need to settle some thorny due process questions.  In that event, 
Tesla is well situated to force at least one of the two issues highlighted in Part 
I.C.  For instance, it can challenge the Court to solve the circuit split over the 
legitimacy of economic protectionism as a state interest for purposes of due 
process review, or it can try to convince the Court to apply a standard of 
review that, though burgeoning, is not widespread.  This means that the Court 
would need to break with precedent and conduct a more searching 
investigation into the proffered interests of the Michigan legislature in 
passing the statute. 
 
 183. Tesla Complaint, supra note 13, para. 55. 
 184. Id. paras. 42–43. 
 185. In Tesla, the underlying restrictions are of direct-to-consumer sales of cars, see supra 
note 14 and accompanying text, and in Granholm the underlying restrictions were of direct-
to-consumer sales of wine, see supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 186. The FTC cited “[t]he vast majority of existing work by economists,” suggesting that 
allowing companies to make the decision of whether to sell their products themselves results 
in “better outcomes for consumers.” U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 6, at 5; see also 
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466–68 (2005) (citing the FTC’s stance against restrictions 
on direct sales of wine). 
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In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,187 the Court opines that overruling 
precedent requires the Court to consider whether the previous 
rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; 
whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special 
hardship to the consequences of overruling . . . ; whether related principles 
of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a 
remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed, or come 
to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant 
application or justification.188 
This implicates two different strategies that the State of Michigan could use 
in defending its law against Tesla.  Michigan could argue that the sole 
justification for abridging Tesla’s due process rights is economic protection 
of a discrete group and that such a justification alone is legitimate for the 
purposes of rational basis review.  Alternatively, it could argue that the statute 
serves other, more obviously legitimate purposes.  In the first case, the Court 
would only need to settle whether economic protectionism is a legitimate 
state interest, which is a question the circuits have split on.  In the second 
case, the Court would be forced to decide whether state interests should be 
taken at face value and, if not, how to test whether such an interest was 
provided in good faith. 
Therefore, if Tesla Motors Inc. v. Johnson reaches the Supreme Court, the 
Court should abandon the rule of unquestioned deference to state legislatures’ 
judgment on questions of economic regulation and rule that economic 
protectionism is not a legitimate state interest.  The Court, when assessing 
whether the Michigan law bears any rational relation to a legitimate state 
interest, should not accept as “rational” the argument that barring direct-to-
consumer sales of cars is a form of consumer protection from dangers such 
as higher pricing, inadequate consumer services, or unsafe cars.  It should be 
suspicious of the political currency that Michigan earns by protecting dealers’ 
associations and GM from competition.  It should reject “evidentiary” 
findings relating to the benefits of the independent dealer-franchise system 
that were published by an organization as self-interested as the NADA, and 
it should credit only evidence produced by neutral evaluators and 
organizations.  If the Court applies this more searching inquiry into the 
motivations and justifications of the state rather than the blind deference of 
Lee Optical, it will inevitably find that the statute barring Tesla and others 
from selling cars directly is related only to the state’s interest in protecting 
the economic interests of major automobile manufacturers and car 
dealerships.  If the Court decides the circuit split in favor of those circuits 
that have found economic protectionism not to be a legitimate state interest, 
then Tesla may win its case. 
The best argument for declaring economic protectionism an insufficient 
justification for economic regulation is that, by allowing state governments 
to statutorily grant protection to certain industry groups, the Court essentially 
 
 187. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 188. Id. at 854–55 (internal citations omitted). 
1456 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
allows politicians to pick winners and losers, or, even worse, to put those 
positions up for sale.  New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson, for instance, 
sees corruption as an inevitable consequence of legislatures’ attempts to 
“bolster one industry, penalize another, or ‘stimulate’ one sort of economic 
activity over another.”189  Even where industrial policy was born out of good 
intentions, the economic effects of such protection are rarely calculated 
properly by politicians.190  Assuming that industries needing economic 
protection lobby governments for it and that governments need these 
lobbying dollars, industry “losers get most of the protection because losers 
lobby harder.”191  Often, these arguments are made in opposition to 
governments’ investments in private companies so as to give one party an 
advantage over others.192  What makes the protectionism practiced by the 
Michigan legislature an even more compelling case for judicial action is that 
it has given well-established economic players an advantage over one party—
a start-up no less. 
In Nebbia v. New York,193 the Court found that “the Legislature is primarily 
the judge of the necessity of [an economic] enactment, that every possible 
presumption is in favor of its validity,” and that “the courts are both 
incompetent and unauthorized to deal” in questioning that wisdom.194  The 
Nebbia Court’s concern, however, is not implicated in Tesla.  The judiciary 
does not impinge on the domain of the legislature by preventing a “naked 
attempt to raise a fortress protecting . . . monopoly rents”195 at the expense 
of consumers. 
When we consider the parameters laid out in Planned Parenthood for when 
overturning precedent is appropriate, it seems clear that the political climate 
has changed significantly to warrant such a ruling.  The fourth justification 
that Court provided, that the “facts have so changed or come to be seen so 
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or 
justification,”196 fits well here.  The reaction to Lochner was an 
understandable response to the apathetic cowboy-capitalists of the industrial 
age.  State legislatures were thus empowered to defend the rights of their 
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constituents against big money interests.  The facts have changed in that those 
same big money interests have bled into the legislative realm, and the 
deferential standard has been “robbed . . . of significant application or 
justification”197 in that, under the modern regime, the courts are the citizens’ 
last line of defense. 
CONCLUSION 
Gone are the days when any regulation served to promote the health and 
wellness of the general population.  In allowing special interests to creep into 
politics, the Court has robbed itself of its ability to check the legislature for 
abuses.  The presumption that a state government has passed a law in 
accordance with good judgment has no place in an arena where an innovative 
business is barred from selling a product that is environmentally sustainable, 
cheaper to the consumer, and easier to buy, simply because the local 
Chrysler-Dodge-Kia dealership would rather not be forced to make car 
buying competitively pleasant.  The Texan from this Note’s Introduction 
should be able to buy the car he wants from whom he wants, especially if 
consumers, corporations, and the environment will be better off if he can. 
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